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ENGAGING WITH THE STATE: THE 
GROWING RELIANCE ON LAWYERS 
AND JUDGES TO PROTECT BATTERED 
WOMEN* 
JANE C. MURPHY" 
INTRODUCTION 
The passage of the federal Violence Against Women Act of 20001 
("VAWA II") marked an important milestone in the evolution of the 
domestic violence movement. VAWA II created, among other things, 
a complex system for state and federal funding in all fifty states to 
provide civil legal assistance to battered women.2 Its passage 
completed a process that began in the early 1980s when domestic 
violence advocates shifted their focus from grass roots efforts to help 
battered women and their children leave abusive partners to building 
alliances with government and advocating for legal remedies to assist 
battered women. This paper looks at the impact of this dramatic shift 
on both battered women and domestic violence programs. It draws 
on empirical data examining women's experiences using these new 
• This title is taken from ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST 
LAWMAKlNG 181 (2000) (citing Nickie Charles, Feminist Politics, Domestic Violence and 
the State, 43 Soc. REV. 617 (l995)). This Article was originally presented at 
Confronting Domestic Violence and Achieving Gender Equality: Evaluating BATTERED 
WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING by Elizabeth M. Schneider at Washington College of Law, 
American University. The author gratefully acknowledges comments of other 
participants at the symposium. The author also wishes to thank Margaret Potthast, 
Rebecca Lakowicz, Robin Travis, and Laura Garcia for excellent research assistance 
and other support for this article. Finally, the author thanks Mary Ann Dutton, Lisa 
Goodman, and Dorothy Lennig for their many insights and contributions during our 
collaboration on the study described in this Article . 
•• Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., Boston College; J.D., New York 
University School of Law. 
l. Violence Against Women Act of 2000 ("VAWA II"), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1464, 1491 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20, 28, and 42 
U.S.c.). 
2. See 42 U .s.C. § 3796gg (Supp. 2002). 
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legal remedies to raise some preliminary questions about the broader 
issue of how well the strategy of .. engaging with the state" serves the 
interests of battered women. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The VISIon of law as an important tool for social change is well 
established.3 Consistent with this vision, early feminists advocated for 
laws against wife-beating in New England as early as the seventeenth 
century.4 These efforts to create laws to protect battered women 
continued and spread through the country during the 19th century 
under the leadership of Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
and other early feminists. 5 However, the plight of battered women 
was not the focus of these early reform movements. Instead, the 
primary goal of these efforts was to encourage temperance, protect 
children, and improve the status of white women by affording them 
the right to divorce, hold property, and vote.6 The" battered 
women's movement" --a coalition of activists working to establish the 
right of women to be free from violence- did not begin to emerge as 
a national movement until the late 1960s.7 The participants in this 
movement were community organizers, shelter workers, civil rights 
workers, and feminist activists. Elizabeth Schneider describes the 
character and origin of the movement: 
The battered women's movement was an outsider movement, a 
grassroots movement that developed from the civil rights and 
feminist movements of the 1960s. Many feminists saw battering as 
the product of patriarchy, as male control over women. Many in 
this movement were skeptical of an affirmative role for the state; 
they saw the state as maintaining, enforcing, and legitimizing male 
3. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in 
Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1993) [hereinafter 
Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change] (citing ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO 
JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 11 (1969»; see generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 
(1923) . 
4. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY 
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 21-22 (1987) (stating 
that magistrates and church courts in the New England colonies enforced laws that 
punished spousal abuse). 
5. See Kathleen J. Tierney, The Battered Women's Movement and the Creation of the 
Wife Beating Problem, 29 Soc. PROB. 207, 207-10 (1982) (discussing the social 
movement to combat wife beating). 
6. See id.; see also ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING 15-16 (2000). 
7. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 53-58 (1982) (discussing the early 
days ofthe battered women's movement). 
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violence against women, not remedying it; they rejected the idea 
that battered women activists ought to trust the state, expect much 
from the state, or engage with the state in any way. The movement 
developed shelters, safe houses, and alternative institutions. 
Groups rejected governmental funding for battered women's 
services and programs.s 
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Despite ambivalence about the government's role in protecting 
battered women, "engaging with the state" emerged as a principal 
strategy of the battered women's movement in the early 1980s and 
developed over the next two decades.9 The movement became 
dominated by lawyers, elected officials and courts. The work shifted 
from establishing shelters, safe houses, and hotlines to drafting 
legislation, lobbying elected officials, and litigating cases to create 
and expand legal protections for battered women. Strategizing about 
how to help battered women shifted from networks of privately 
funded shelters to government sponsored and staffed Family 
Violence Councils. to This advocacy resulted in the passage of 
legislation creating a variety of state criminal statutes designed to 
prosecute and punish domestic violence. 11 These efforts to enhance 
criminal prosecution of domestic violence culminated in the passage 
of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA").12 This Act, 
among other things, made certain acts of domestic violence federal 
8. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 182. 
9. See id. at 182-83; see also NAT'L COMM'N ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INT'L WOMEN'S 
YEAR, BATTERED WOMEN (1978) (calling on the President and Congress to .. declare 
the elimination of violence in the home to be a national goal ... [by] establish[ing] 
a national clearinghouse for information ... and crisis intervention techniques, and 
the need for prompt and effective enforcement of laws that protect the rights of 
battered women"), available at http://womhist.binghamton.edu/vawa/docl.htm. 
10. See, e.g., MD. ATT'y GEN., FAMILY VIOLENCE COUNCIL (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) 
(describing the Family Violence Council in Maryland, which is housed in the 
Attorney General's Office)' available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Family/ 
index.htm; N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE POLICY DEVELOPMENT TOOL (last visited Nov. 6, 2002), available at 
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/coordination/poldev_tool.html; PA. ATT'Y GEN. 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT, FINAL ACTION PLAN - A COORDINATED, COMMUNITY-BASED 
RESPONSE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE (last visited Nov. 6, 2002), available at 
www.attorneygeneral.gov/family/; see also Leonard P. Edwards, Reducing Family 
Violence: The Role of the Family Violence Council, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. NO.3, 1, 3-7 
(1992) . 
11. See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 
51 (2001). 
12. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (1994) (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 8, 18,20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the history of 
VA WA and a summary of its contents, see Sally F. Goldfarb, "No Civilized System of 
Justice": The Fate of the Violence Against Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 504-09 
(2000) (detailing the various subtitles of VA WA and explaining that the Act 
increased prison sentences for individuals convicted of some federal sex crimes). 
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crimes,I3 mandated interstate enforcement of protective orders,I4 and 
provided training for prosecutors, police and state and federal 
judges. 15 
While improving the criminal justice response to domestic violence 
was an important piece of the new array of legal remedies, the 
enactment and expansion of civil protection or restraining orders 
evolved into a primary strategy for improving the safety of battered 
women.
16 Between 1976 and 1992, all fifty states enacted civil 
protection order legisiation,I7 making it one of the most commonly 
used legal remedies for battered women. 18 After enactment of the 
statute, advocacy efforts shifted to training judges, lawyers, and clerks, 
as well as funding services, including legal representation, to 
implement the statute. 19 While state governments contributed some 
funding to these efforts, the passage of VAWA II marked a major 
national commitment of funding to encourage the use of civil 
protection orders and other civil remedies as a response to domestic 
violence.20 Some funding was made available to shelters, but the vast 
13. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2262 (1994 & Supp. 2002) (imposing federal prison 
terms for persons who travel in interstate commerce and commit a crime of violence 
or attempt to commit a crime of violence against a spouse or intimate partner). 
14. See 18 U .S.C. § 2265 (1994 & Supp. 2002) (mandating that protective orders 
issued by one state be given full faith and credit and mandating their enforcement by 
any state having jurisdiction). 
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 13991 (1994 & Supp. 2002). In the first year of 
implementation of VAWA, fifty-six awards totaling $26 million were made to the 
states and District of Columbia. By 1996, there were 400 grants amounting to more 
than $165 million. 
16. Civil protection orders are temporary orders designed to provide battered 
women with a quick, easily obtainable order requiring the batterer to refrain from 
abuse and providing other potential relief including use of the home, financial relief, 
and child custody while the victim pursues more long term solutions such as divorce 
or relocation. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, State and Federal Laws on 
Domestic Violence Injunctions, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 16-1 (David Frazee et al. 
eds., 1997); see also NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY CT. JUVENILE JUDGES, 
MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994). 
17. See Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1498,1529 (1993). 
18. See Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with 
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. pQL'y REV. 51, 52 (2000) (noting that civil 
protection orders serve two purposes: to empower victims and to deter the 
perpetrators of violence); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 49-50. 
19. See, e.g., Katherine Triantafillou, Massachusetts: New Legislation to Help Battered 
Women, 27 JUDGES]. No.3, Summer 1988, at 20 (discussing legislation enacted in 
Massachusetts) . 
20. See Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000); see also Press Release, Violence 
Against Women Office, U.S. Dep't of justice, justice Department Awards Over $23 
Million for Civil Legal Assistance to Victims of Domestic Violence (Oct. 19, 2000) 
[hereinafter Press Release 1 (describing VA WA II as the first time Congress has 
authorized a civil legal assistance program for battered women), available at 
http://www.usnewswire.com/OjP/docs/ojpOOOI14.html. 
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majority of the over $23 million in civil legal assistance funding in 
2001 went to law school clinics, legal services offices, and bar 
associations in all fifty states, three territories, and the District of 
Columbia.21 In addition to the direct funding for civil legal 
assistance, VA WA II also authorized formula grants to states for 
.. Services, Training, Officers, Prosecutors" (" STOP grants"). Many 
of the state STOP grant implementation plans include direct funding 
for legal assistance in proceedings to obtain or enforce civil 
protection orders.22 In addition, substantial funding for initiatives for 
data collection, communications systems, and community 
coordination approaches have been designed with the goal of 
improving the effectiveness of civil protection orders.23 
II. IMPACT OF ENGAGING THE STATE: UNDERSTANDING BATTERED 
WOMEN'S USE OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS 
The question raised by Elizabeth Schneider and others is what 
impact state engagement in the battered women's movement has had 
on women who experience domestic violence.24 Heavy reliance on 
the coercive power of the state's criminal laws as a response to 
domestic violence has been controversial from the start.25 However, 
21. See Press Release, supra note 20 (noting that many domestic violence victims 
do not have the resources to hire attorneys). 
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, STOP VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN FORMULA GRANTS, VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACT OF 1994 (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (authorizing formula grants to states), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/ataglance/family.htm.See.e.g .• MD. 
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN GRANTS (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (reporting the availability of $2.104 
million in grant funds to states), available at http://www.goccp.org/ goccp/ grants/ 
grantlist.sap#s. 
23. See SUSAN L. KEILITZ ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROTECTION 
ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 4-5 
(1997) . 
24. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 181-98. While Schneider focuses her 
exploration of these issues on mandatory arrest legislation and the VA WA civil rights 
remedy, her thoughtful analysis of the theoretical and practical implications of state 
engagement in those arenas is helpful in considering the whole range of state 
involvement. Id.; see also Merle H. Weiner, From Dollars to Sense: A Critique of 
Government Funding for the Battered Women's Shelter Movement, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 185, 
204-46 (1991) (examining and critiquing the battered women's shelter movement's 
reliance on government funding). 
25. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State 
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 557-71 (1999) (arguing against the 
implementation of mandatory arrest, prosecution, and reporting poliCies because 
these mandatory state interventions may worsen the mental and physical health and 
safety of the battered woman they are meant to help); Donna Coker, Crime Control 
and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
801. 805 (2001) (noting that the focus on the criminal aspect of domestic violence 
deflects attention from other strategies for combating domestic violence); see also 
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less critical attention has been paid to the significant public resources 
devoted to encouraging the use of civil protection orders. This may 
be because the use of civil protection orders (" CPOs") does not 
involve the same degree of coercion and state control inherent in 
criminal remedies. Michelle Waul has described the protective order 
as unique among the array of judicial responses to domestic violence 
because it II represent[s] the intersection of traditional community-
based and justice system approaches: victim empowerment coupled 
with deterrence. A CPO combines a victim-initiated intervention with 
the power of enforcement by the criminal justice system." 26 
Despite the element of II empowerment" in CPOs, the level of state 
endorsement, state funding, and advocacy focus on this remedy 
warrant a closer look at its value to battered women. Evaluating the 
impact of this aspect of the strategy shift is difficult. Most would 
agree that the intense focus on CPOs has been a success if it 
improved the safety and well-being of battered women. But how to 
measure II improved safety and well-being" is open to debate. Much 
of the existing empirical research examining the impact of the new 
array of legal remedies define "improved safety" in terms of orders 
obtained or rates of reabuse.27 In other studies, surveys of service 
providers, police or court records, rather than women's voices, are 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 184·85 (indicating the conflict among advocates 
concerning coercive actions such as mandatory arrests and no-drop prosecution and 
discussing some of the reasons battered women may not wish to prosecute 
complaints); SCHECHTER, supra note 7, at 174-83. 
26. Waul, supra note 18, at 53. Interestingly, the advocacy for this legislation was 
most effective when it was a collaborative effort between grass-roots activists, lawyers, 
and government officials. See Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change, supra note 3, at 
1268·92 (analyzing the effort to improve legal remedies to protect battered women in 
Maryland). 
27. See, e.g., Janice Grau et aI., Domestic Violence-Battered Women: Restraining Orders 
for Battered Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLITICS AND 
WOMEN: THE AFTERMATH OF LEGALLY MANDATED CHANGE 13, 21-24 (Claudine 
Schweber & Clarice Feinman eds., 1985); ADELE V. HARRELL ET AL., COURT 
PROCESSING THE EFFECTS OF RESTRAINING ORDERS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(1993); Andrew K. Klein, Re-abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers: Why 
Restraining Orders Don't Work, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192, 199-
209 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996); Richard A. Berk et aI., Mutual 
Combat and Other Family Violence Myths, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY 
VIOLENCE RESEARCH 197, 204-10 (DaVid Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983); Matthew]' 
Carlson et aI., Protective Orders and Doemstic Violence: Risk Factors for Re-Abuse, 14 ]. OF 
FAMILY VIOLENCE 205,213 (1999); Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in 
Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. 
J. WOMEN & L. 163, 167 (1993). But see Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do 
Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, 
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 227, 233-45 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) 
(discussing the successes and failures of women obtaining temporary restraining 
orders in New Haven, Connecticut); KEILlTZ, supra note 23, at 37-44 (discussing the 
benefits and limitations of civil protection orders and how improvements to quality 
of life were measured) . 
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the primary source of data.28 As a result, these studies tell us relatively 
little about how the emphasis on CPOs has affected battered women's 
experience of abuse and its changes over time, particularly during 
and following court intervention.29 
A. Ecological Model of Battered Women's Experience Over Time 
A recently completed study, Ecological Model of Battered Women's 
Experience Over Time,JO attempted to fill some of the gaps in existing 
domestic violence research. The study was a collaborative effort in 
which I was joined by three others who focused much of their 
professional lives on domestic violence issues: two researchers in the 
field of clinical psycholog/l and a practitioner who has advocated for 
battered women in the courts and legislature for over fifteen years.32 
The study was interdisciplinary in two senses: it was a 
researcher / practitioner collaboration joining experts from the fields 
of law and psychology.33 
The study examined the experiences of 406 women who sought 
intervention for domestic violence. The women were recruited over 
seven months Oune 1999 to January 2000) from three sites in 
Baltimore, Maryland. The first site, the House of Ruth Shelter 
(16.7% of the sample recruited), is the main shelter for battered 
women in Baltimore. The second site (29.1 %) is a specialized 
criminal court handling all domestic violence misdemeanor cases in 
the city. The third site, from which the majority of participants were 
recruited (54.2%), is the court where domestic violence victims seek 
civil protection orders. To participate in the study, a participant had 
28. See, e.g., Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent Decline in 
Domestic Violence, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY (forthcoming Apr. 2003) (on file 
with author); HARRELL ET AL., supra note 27; Klein, supra note 27; Berk et aI., supra 
note 27, at 198; Richard J. Gelles, Methodological Issues in the Study of Family Violence, in 
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 24 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles 
eds., 1990). 
29. See supra note 28. 
30. MARY ANN DUTTON ET AL., ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF BATTERED WOMEN'S 
EXPERIENCE OVER TIME (2002). This study was funded under Award No. RX 429806 
by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
31. Principal Investigator Mary Ann Dutton, Ph.D. (Georgetown University Medical 
Center) and Co-Principal Investigator Lisa Goodman, Ph.D. (Boston College). 
32. Dorothy]. Lennig, Esq., Director, House of Ruth Domestic Violence Legal 
Clinic, Baltimore, Maryland. 
33. The need for researcher/practitioner collaborations in domestic violence 
research has been identified by domestic violence advocates in recent years. See, e.g., 
Joan Zorza, The Problem with Proxy Measures: The Inaccuracy of the Conflict Tactic Scales 
and Other Crime Surveys in Measuring Intimate Partner Violence, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP., 
Aug./Sept. 2001, at 83. 
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to be a female victim of intimate partner violence perpetrated by a 
man who was a current or former intimate partner. The women were 
interviewed at the time of recruitment and were followed in four 
telephone interviews conducted every three months over the year 
following recruitment. The retention rate at the end of the study was 
82%.34 
The study did not set out to address the impact of state 
engagement in domestic violence or even answer the narrower 
question of the effectiveness of civil protection orders in reducing 
violence. Rather, the primary purposes of the study were to identify 
and predict the patterns of battered women's experiences of violence 
and abuse, their appraisals of risk, and strategic responses to 
violence.35 Listening to women's experiences and responses to 
domestic violence does lead, however, to some important 
observations about the practical impact of increased government 
funding and involvement in civil protection orders. How has the shift 
in emphasis changed the focus of domestic violence programs and, 
more importantly, does this shift best address the needs and interests 
of battered women? 
1. Supporting Data 
The study produced substantial data about the range of strategies 
women use in response to intimate partner violence, how often they 
use particular strategies and how helpful women believe these 
strategies have been.36 At the initial interview, participants were 
asked: 
There are a lot of different things that women do to deal with 
violence or threats. Some can be helpful and some can make 
things worse. Have you ever done any of the following things to 
help yourself feel better about the violence or abuse? If your 
response is 'yes,' looking back, please indicate how helpful this was 
(scale of 1 to 5)? 
The questionnaire listed thirty-nine strategies38 and women 
34. For a complete description of the study methodology, see MARY ANN DUTION 
ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, LONGITUDINAL PATIERNS OF INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE, RISK, WELL-BEING, AND EMPLOYMENT: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (2001). 
35. See, e.g., Lisa Goodman et aI., The Intimate Partner Violence Strategies Index: 
Development and Application, in 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163 (Feb. 2003); Robin J. 
Belamaric et al.. The Role of Family Structure in Battered Women's Threat Appraisal and Re-
abuse, 18 FAMILY VIOLENCE & SEXUAL ASSAULT BULLETIN 15 (Fall 2002). 
36. See Goodman et aI., supra note 35. 
37. TIME 1 RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE, AN ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF BATIERED 
WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OVER TIME, PHASES I. 
38. Goodman et aI., supra note 35, at app. 
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indicated whether they had ever used them and, if so, how helpful 
they had been. In analyzing the data gathered from these responses, 
the thirty-nine strategies were divided into either "public" or 
" private." 39 The list was further refined into six categories of strategic 
PI . 40 R' 41 SCI . 42 L I 43 F I responses: acatmg, eSlstance, alety-p annmg, ega, orma 
Network,44 and Informal Network.45 Not surprisingly, we learned that 
most women use a combination of strategies over time.46 In trying to 
understand how the four strategies categorized as "legal" fit within 
the framework,47 we found that two of those strategies-" called 
police" and" filed for a protective order" -were among the ten most 
commonly used strategies.48 Although women generally started with 
private strategies and moved to public strategies, the subset that 
turned to public strategies also continued to use private strategies.49 
Overall, the data suggested that "women were more likely to use 
private strategies, such as placating and resisting than public 
strategies that involved seeking help from the legal system or other 
community agencies. . .. This is especially striking given that the 
39. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 91-97 (discussing that this public/private and 
formal/informal divide found in battered women's strategies reflects the shifting 
parameters of private and public for battered women Schneider and others have 
discussed) . 
40. Placating: private strategies intended to change batterer behavior, do not 
challenge his control, mayor may not involve direct communication with the 
batterer, example-- did whatever he wanted in order to stop or prevent violence or abuse. 
Goodman et ai., supra note 35, at app. 
41. Resistance: private strategies intended to change batterer behavior, directly 
challenge his control, mayor may not involve direct confrontation with the batterer, 
example-refused to do what he said. Id. 
42. Safety-planning: private strategies do not involve direct communication with 
the batterer, are not intended to change batterer behavior, but are intended to 
increase resources and/or options for escaping or preventing a future assault, 
example-kept a supply of basics ready for escape. Id. 
43. Legal: public strategies intended to change batterer behavior, involve use of 
the legal system, example-filed a petition for an ex parte/protection order. Id. 
44. Formal Network: public strategies intended to change batterer behavior or 
increase resources/options for escape, involve use of community (non-legal) 
resources, example-talked to a doctor or nurse about the abuse. Id. 
45. Informal Network: private strategies which are not intended to change 
batterer behavior, increase resources, involve use of informal resources such as 
family or friends. Id. 
46. See id. at 175 (highlighting that over half (54%) of the participants reported 
using at least one strategy within each category). 
47. See id. 
48. See infra at app. A (listing commonly used strategies for battered women). 
49. See Goodman, supra note 35, at 181 (finding that" the more violence women 
endure, the more determined they become to find ways to end it, and the more 
willing they become to intensify their efforts without a broad range of arenas, both 
private and public, both confrontational and nonconfrontational, both placating and 
resisting. " ) . 
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sample selection was based on women who had pursued public 
strategies. ,,50 While some researchers have found that ethnicitll and 
income52 influence women's response to domestic violence, this study 
did not reveal differences in strategies based on those factors. 
When we asked study participants to rate the helpfulness of the 
strategies they used, we again found that the same two legal 
strategies-" calling the police," and" filing for a protective order"-
ranked among the top ten most helpful strategies. 53 Interestingly, 
however, the remaining strategies on the list were mostly private 
"safety planning" strategies, with the strategy identified as the most 
helpful being" talked to someone at a domestic violence program." 54 
To explore women's experiences in attempting to obtain civil 
protection orders, the study collected data from court files as well as 
interviews. 55 An examination of the court records available for the 
study participants in the CPO sample revealed that more than half of 
the women who filed petitions for protective orders never received 
one. 56 While 99% of women obtained the first stage or ex parte 
order, less than half of the women (41 %) received the full protection 
50. Id. at 179-80 (noting that this data is consistent with other research that has 
found that most battered women initially respond to violence with private strategies 
and only a smaller group add public strategies to combat violence). See generally L.B. 
Lempert, Women's Strategies for Survival: Developing Agency in Abusive Relationships, 11 ]. 
OFFAM. VIOLENCE 3,269·89 (1996). 
51. See, e.g., J-Ellen Asbury, African-American Women in Violent Relationships: An 
Exploration of Cultural Differences, in VIOLENCE AND THE BLACK FAMILY 89 (Robert L. 
Hampton ed., 1987): Soraya M. Coley & Joyce O. Beckett, Black Battered Women: A 
Review of Empirical Literature, 66 ]. COUNSELING & DEV. 266 (1988): Jenny Rivera, 
Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, 
and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.]. 231, 234·38 (1994): Karin Wang, 
Comment, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses from the Battered 
Women's Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 160-63 (1996). 
52. See, e.g., Patricia O'Campo et aI., Surviving Physical and Sexual Abuse: What 
Helps Low Income Women, 46 PATIENTEDUC. & COUNSELING No.3, 205-12 (2002). 
53. See infra at app. B (listing the ten most helpful strategies for battered 
women). 
54. Id. 
55. Interestingly, we found that women's account of what happened in court and 
what was recorded in the court records was often inconsistent. A full exploration of 
the gap between women's perceptions and court records is beyond the scope of this 
paper but the existence of this gap suggests, among other things, that the court 
proceedings leave many women confused about both the court process and the 
results of court hearings. 
56. See infra at app. C (detailing the attrition of women in CPO court). 
Obtaining a civil protection order is typically a two part process. The first stage 
involves an ex parte hearing in which the court may give limited, short term relief 
without notice or an appearance by the opposing party or respondent. The second 
stage, usually one to two weeks later, requires notice to the respondent by service of 
the petition and ex parte order and results in a more long term order with broader 
relief ("full" protection order). Klein & Orloff, supra note 16. . 
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order.57 A substantial number of women (30%) did not go back for 
the CPO hearing, and the law enforcement agency charged with 
serving the ex parte order on the batterer failed to serve the order in 
50% of the cases. 58 
2. Implications of the Data 
What does this data tell us about the impact of a strategy that 
places great emphasis on civil protection orders to improve the safety 
and well-being of battered women? The good news is that women are 
aware of the availability of CPOs and are seeking these orders in great 
numbers as a strategy in response to violence.59 Furthermore, a 
substantial sample considered" filing for a protective order" a helpful 
strategy.60 How can this remedy have been helpful when so many did 
not receive the full protective order? To answer this question, one 
must fully explore the reasons why full orders are not obtained in 
many cases. One explanation-the answer most judges and many 
lawyers would give you-is that battered women don't "follow 
through." In our study, the court records indicate that 30% of the 
women who received ex parte orders did not appear at the second 
stage protective order hearing.61 This perception of " victim 
dropout" -a woman's "decision" not to follow through on the 
process of obtaining a CPO-is part of a larger discussion that 
responds to the question" why do women stayT This issue has been 
of interest to domestic violence scholars and advocates for some 
time.62 What has changed as a result of state funding is that rates of 
.. victim dropout" have also become, indirectly, the subject of state 
scrutiny.63 If a program is designed to assist women in getting CPOs, 
the number of orders obtained helps define the success of the 
program for purposes of continued governmental funding. 54 When 
57. See infra at app. C. 
58. Id. 
59. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 16; see also infra at app. A (noting that 72.8% of 
the study participants filed protection orders). 
60. See infra at app. B (noting that 68.4% of the study participants listed" filed for 
a protection order" as helpful). 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1,2-4 (1991); JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE 
COURTROOM 136-67 (1999) (describing women's experiences seeking restraining 
orders) . 
63. See VAWA II, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg-6 (describing eligibility of grants and 
appropriations of funds authorized by the Legal Assistance for Victims Grant 
Program); 28 C.F.R. § 90.24 (2002). 
64. Interview with Dorothy J. Lennig, Director, House of Ruth Domestic Violence 
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obtaining full protection orders for all women becomes a priority for 
domestic violence programs and law clinics across the country, much 
of the human and financial capital in the domestic violence 
community focus on achieving that goal.65 
The study offers some new insights into (1) whether "victim 
dropout" fully explains the substantial number of cases in which 
women do not obtain full orders and (2) whether counting the 
number of civil protection orders obtained is always an appropriate 
measure of" success" in designing and funding programs to meet the 
needs of battered women. First, with regard to the reasons for 
"victim dropout," we learned that, at least in the jurisdiction studied, 
significant institutional barriers limit women's ability to obtain the 
full protection order. Law enforcement failure or inability to serve 
the petition and ex parte order on the respondent to give him the 
notice required by the statute66 delayed or made impossible the 
issuance of a protective order in a large number (50%) of cases.67 
Extensions of the ex parte order to allow for more time for service 
are permitted under most CPO statutes. 66 A look at the 
demographics of our sample, however, demonstrates the difficulty 
many women may experience in returning to court a second, third, 
and even a fourth time to get the civil protection order.69 Although 
all of our sample came from an urban area and was predominantly 
African-American, their characteristics illustrate the range of 
individual, interpersonal and community-level factors that impact 
how difficult pursuing this process to conclusion may be for many 
women.
70 For example, a significant majority (67.1%) of the CPO 
sample was employed and had at least one child (92%). The vast 
Legal Clinic, in Baltimore, Md. Oune 6, 2002) (transcript on file with author) 
(describing pressure by state funders in Maryland to increase the number of 
protection orders obtained in state-funded courthouse assistance projects). 
65. rd. 
66. See, e.g., MD. FAM. L. CODE ANN. § 4-505(b) (2001) (providing that law 
enforcement officers shall immediately serve temporary ex parte orders on alleged 
abusers) . 
67. See infra at app. C (illustrating that service of ex parte orders was completed 
in only 50% of the cases studied). 
68. See, e.g., MD. FAM. L. CODE ANN. § 4-505(c) (2001) (establishing that a court 
may extend a temporary ex parte order for up to thirty days in order to provide 
protection or for other" good cause" ). 
69. See infra at apps. D-E (showing that many of the women in the survey are 
working, lack a formal education, and have children, all of which contribute to the 
difficulty of returning to court multiple times). . 
70. See id. (illustrating factors that can be applied to all races). But see Miriam H. 
Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in 
Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 187-90 (1994) (discussing how 
race and class can impact domestic violence policy and enforcement). 
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majority of women (85.6%) had an income of less than $25,000.71 At a 
minimum, the demands of employment, the need for childcare, and 
low income are barriers to a woman's ability to attend the multiple 
court appearances that are often needed to obtain the full order.72 
We also found that most women did not have attorneys 
representing them in their civil protection order court hearings. Of 
the 142 women in this sample, only thirty-six had legal representation 
for the protective order court hearing.73 A VAWA-funded legal 
clinic74 is housed in the courthouse in which the women were 
recruited but many women either chose not to use the clinic legal 
representation or were unable to be served by this office.75 The lack 
of legal representation in CPO proceedings makes it difficult for 
litigants to understand and complete the process and learn about the 
existence of other services.76 In this study, we found that having an 
attorney substantially increased the rate of success in obtaining a 
protection order. 77 In the small sample of women who had an 
71. See infra at apps. D-E. 
72. See, e.g., Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL'Y & L. 367 (2003) (examining the impact that class differentials have on 
domestic violence). 
73. See infra at app. F. 
74. House of Ruth operates the Protection Order Advocacy and Representation 
Project (" POARP") in the District Court of Maryland. HOUSE OF RUTH, ANNUAL 
REPORT (2002), available at www.houseofruth.org/artworkI2002artwork/ar/ 
report.pdf. POARP, which is funded through the State of Maryland's VAWA STOP 
grant, was started to represent people who have been abused by an intimate partner 
in proceedings to obtain, enforce and modify protective orders. 
75. In FY 2001 there were 3475 domestic abuse hearings filed in the District 
Court in Baltimore City. Of those, POARP provided legal advice in 606 of the cases 
and represented 210 litigants in hearings. The reasons for the relatively small 
percentage of women served by POARP are not completely clear. Part of the reason 
is that the services are not readily available to all individuals seeking a protective 
order. While the POARP office is only open from 8:30-4:30, Monday-Friday, staff is 
limited and not able to represent every individual seeking assistance. Even when the 
office is open and lawyers are available, some women choose not to obtain 
representation or are confused about the role attorneys play in the court 
bureaucracy. This conclusion is based on my ten years' experience as a director of a 
law school clinical program with a program to represent battered women in civil 
protection orders based in the District Court in Maryland. Women re~ularly refuse 
the law school clinic's offers oflegal representation telling us they" don t have time," 
.. already saw the clerk," or, for other reasons, do not want legal representation. 
76. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 95-96 (discussing the legal and social obstacles 
facing battered women in search of alternate remedies); see also Peter Margulies, 
Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of 
Access. Connection. and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1995) (arguing that 
there is a dichotomy between domestic violence law and poverty law that ignores the 
connection between the two). 
77. See infra at app. G (illustrating that those clients represented by attorneys 
obtained orders more than twice as frequently as those without attorneys); see also 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 95-96 (reporting the difficulties that many domestic 
violence victims have in finding, retaining, and paying well-trained lawyers). 
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attorney, most (83%) were successful in getting the protective order 
while only 32% of women without an attorney got the order. 78 
In addition to the structural barriers to getting the full protection 
order, including the lack of legal representation and law 
enforcement delay or failure to serve ex parte orders, the 
demographic characteristics of our sample provide some interesting 
insight into why some women may choose not to return for the full 
order. The standard provisions of the full CPO, which last up to a 
year and prohibit contact between the parties, might not respond to 
the needs of some women. Many of the women in our CPO sample 
were planning either to continue an intimate relationship with their 
batterer (17.3%) 79 or at least remain in contact with their abusers in 
the future (39.3%).00 In addition, the right to obtain use and 
possession of the home may not be important for as many women as 
advocates have assumed. Nearly three quarters of the CPO sample 
were living with their abuser at the time of the violent incident that 
brought them to the attention of the court8! but most (66.7%) were 
living in places that the woman or her family rented or owned.82 
The fact of motherhood also limits and complicates a battered 
woman's range of choices in response to abuse.83 As noted, almost all 
(92%) of the women from the CPO sample had children and most 
(78%) had children living with them.84 It has long been recognized 
that seeking a CPO may put a battered woman and her children at 
greater risk of abuse from the batterer85 or trigger state involvement 
in the care of her children.86 
Qualitative data from the study also provide support for the 
78. See infra at app. G. 
79. See infra at app. E. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 148-78 (describing the unique 
circumstances of battered women who are pregnant or who have children). 
84. See infra at app. E. 
85. See Mahoney. supra note 62, at 20-21 (asserting that battered mothers cannot 
act with only themselves in mind because they are inextricably bound to their 
children and their children's interests). But see Belamaric, supra note 35 (analyzing 
data from this study and finding that. although family structure did not seem to 
affect rates or severity of reabuse. having children in common with the abuser did 
contribute to battered women's subjective fears of reabuse). 
86. See Jane Murphy. Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare 
"Reform." Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688. 745 (1998) (asserting 
that some battered mothers may not seek the protections of the court system because 
they fear prosecution for failure to protect their children or a custody battle with the 
abuser) . 
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proposition that some women may choose not to return for the full 
protection order because obtaining an ex parte order was sufficient 
to meet their goals. At the second interview, three months after 
recruitment, women were asked: "Have you gotten what you hoped 
for from filing for an ex parte or peace order 3 months ago?" The 
comments from the women who got the ex parte but not the full 
protection order included: 
~ Motivated him-wake up call. Felt supported. 
~ He now knows she's serious. 
~ Sent message to him. 
~ Ex parte was enough time for her to get her own place. 
~ Gave her insight on herself, methods & ways to deal with abuse. 
~ Got what she wanted, he stayed away. 
~ He's out of her life. 
~ Just the paperwork was helpful. 
~ Got him to straighten up. 
~ Good because cops check on him. 
~ Everything went the way she wanted & he's staying away. 
~ Didn't get PO, but house in her name only & it got him out. 
~ Yes, keeping him away. 
~ Satisfied. Not violent. Everyone helpful. 
~ Knows if he does it again he'll be locked up. 
~ Dropped. Maybe could be reconciliation.87 
Thus, for many women, not following through with the proceeding 
to get the final order was, to some extent, a choice. Getting the ex 
parte order alone helped them achieve some of their goals - getting 
the abuser to stay away, stopping the violence, or making a 
reconciliation possible.88 This data underscores an important 
message for advocates and state funders. When women file for a 
CPO, they are pursuing this legal remedy as one strategy among 
many others--both legal and non-legal, public and private, formal and 
informal- to achieve their goals. They do not frame their goals in 
terms of the legal remedies available- for instance "to get a protective 
order." Rather, their goals depend upon their particular context and 
stage in their relationship: " to stop the violence, to get him 
counseling, to keep him away from the kids." 89 If the legal remedy, 
87. DUTTON ET AL., supra note 30. The finding that, for some women the ex parte 
order alone provides the protection or intervention they were seeking, is consistent 
with other studies measuring the effectiveness of protective orders. KEILITZ ET AL., 
supra note 23: Chaudhuri & Daly, supra note 27. 
88. DUTTON ET AL., supra note 30. 
89. Id. 
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whether it is an ex parte or a civil protection order, gets them closer 
to that goal, it is viewed as helpful. This is not to suggest that 
counseling designed to encourage women to complete the legal 
process for a full protection order is always inappropriate. However, 
it is also important to allow battered women to identify their goals, 
and to listen carefully when they do. We need to recognize that 
women use multiple strategies, and to understand that a case ending 
without a protective order does not always mean the advocate has 
failed or the woman has been passive in the face of abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to a society in which violence in families is dealt with 
.. privately" is not in the best interests of battered women. Making 
batterers accountable in criminal court and providing civil remedies 
for battered women can be important tools for women responding to 
abuse. The civil protection order has an important place in the 
broad range of strategies women use in response to abuse from their 
intimate partners. Therefore, we need to remove the barriers that 
prevent women who desire the full protection of this remedy from 
getting these orders. At the same time, understanding where legal 
remedies fit into the spectrum of strategies that battered women use 
is important for both advocates and government funders. Direct 
services and support for battered women, including shelter, 
counseling, employment opportunities, childcare, and mental health 
supports, remain critical tools for many battered women at some 
stage of their experience of abuse. These services should not be 
ignored in the pressure to meet statistical goals for grant funding. 90 
Similarly, as advocates create alliances with government officials, 
including police, prosecutors, judges and elected officials, we must 
maintain our autonomy, independence and critical perspective. In 
this way, we remain most flexible and responsive to the needs of 
battered women. 
90. Shelters and other non-legal services for battered women may also suffer 
from .. dependency. autonomy loss .... cooptation .... and bureaucracy" from over 
reliance on government funding. Weiner. supra note 24. at 186. 
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APPENDIX A 
Top 10 MOST COMMONLY USED STRATEGIES FOR 
BATIERED WOMEN91 
STRATEGY 
1. Ended the relationship. 
2. Refused to do what he said. 
3. Called police. 
4. Fought back physically. 
5. Slept separately. 
6. Left home to get away from him. 
7. Filed for protection order. 
8. Tried to keep things quiet for him. 
9. Tried not to cry. 
10. Talked to family members about how to 
protect myself. 
Prevalence 
86.9% 
86.5% 
85.2% 
82.0% 
80.4% 
78.7% 
72.8% 
70.0% 
69.6% 
69.0% 
515 
91. .. Most Commonly Used" is defined as a strategy used by 69% or more of the 
study participants. 
Data Source: DUTTON ET AL.. supra note 30. 
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APPENDIX B 
Top 10 MOST HELPFUL STRATEGIES FOR BATTERED 
WOMEN92 
Strategy % Finding Strategy Helpful 
1. Talked to someone at a domestic 
violence program. 78.9 
2. Kept important phone numbers you 
could use to get help. 78.3 
3. Hid important papers. 
4. Talked to family members about 
how to protect yourself. 
5. Called police. 
6. Sent the kids to stay with 
relatives or friends. 
7. Stayed with family or friends. 
8. Hid money/valuables. 
9. Filed for protection order. 
10. Worked out an escape plan. 
74.8 
74.8 
73.5 
70.2 
68.9 
68.4 
68.1 
92. Endorsed by 68% or more of study participants as helpful, quite helpful or an 
extremely helpful strategy. 
Data Source: DUTTON ET AL., supra note 30. 
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APPENDIX C 
A TTRITION OF WOMEN IN CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER (" CPO") 
COUR'f3 
250~-----------------·--------·---------------·---------, 
200 
150 
100 
50 
o 
n=205 n = 203 (99%) n = 144 (70%) n = 102 (50%) n = 84 (41%) 
(100%) Total Obtained Ex Went back for Service of Ex Obtained CPO 
Sample Parte CPO Parte 
Completed 
Level of "Success" in Court 
93. Data Source: DUTION ET AL., supra note 30. 
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APPENDIXD 
DEMOGRAPHICS: CIVL PROTECTION ORDER (" CPO") 
SAMPLE94 
RACE: 
African American 81.4% 
Anglo 14.9% 
Other 3.7% 
ACE: 
Mean 33.2 
Std. Deviation 8.76 
Minimum 17 
Maximum 63 
EMPLOYMENT: 
Not Employed 32.9% 
Employed 67.1% 
SCHOOL: 
11 th Grade or Lower 21.5% 
12th Grade 28.3% 
Trade School or Some College 41.6% 
AA and Higher 8.7% 
INCOME: 
$25,000 and Below 85.6% 
Above $25,000 14.4% 
94. Data Source: DUTTON ET AL., supra note 30. 
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APPENDIX E 
CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER STUDY PARTICIPANTS: 
RELATIONSHIPS95 
RELATIONSHIP 
WITH Married 42.1% 
BATTERERS Boyfriend 57.9% 
Currently Estranged Relationship 81.5% 
Expect to Continue Relationship 17.3% 
Expect to Have Contact 39.3% 
LIVING 
ARRANGEMENT Living Together 67.1% 
Not Living Together 32.9% 
WHERE LIVING 
Mine or My Family 66.7% 
His or His Family 7.5% 
Mine and His 25.8% 
CHILDREN 
YEslNo Children 91.3% 
No Children 8.7% 
CHILDREN 
WITH Children with Batterer 47.5% 
BATTERER No Children with Batterer 52.5% 
YEslNo Children at Home 78.0% 
NUMBER OF 
CHILDREN Mean 1.61 
LIVING WITH Minimum 0 
HER Maximum 5 
N 218 
PROTECTIVE 
SERVICES Children Removed From Home for 8.9% 
INVOL VEMENT any Reason 
If Removed-Due to Abuser's 25.0% 
Violence 
95. Data Source: DUlTON ET AL., supra note 30. 
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APPENDIX F 
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN SEEKING CPO WHO HAD LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION96 
90-r-------------------------------------------~ 
80 
70+----------------------------
60 
50 
40~------------------------------
30 
20 
10 
0+----'-
With Attorneys -- 17.5% (n = 36) Without Attorney -- 82.5% (n = 106) 
96. Data Source: DUTTON ET AL., supra note 30. 
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APPENDIXG 
STUDY SAMPLE SEEKING CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: THE IMPACT 
OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION97 
90 
(83%) 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
With Attorney (n = 36) Without Attorney (n = 169) 
[J Obtained Protective Order 
• Failed to Obtain Protective Order 
97. Data Source: DUTION ET AL., supra note 30. 
